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HEW YORK STMt SCHOOL 
1HNISTR1AL AND LABOR R E U T » 
1/10/94 Com«»H -UnM***** 
The Wagner Act and the Quest ion of Workplace Rep re sen t a t i on 
David Brody 
Nearly sixty y e a r s have p a s s e d since the passage of the National 
Labor Relat ions Act in 1935. So far removed are we from t h a t time, 
remarked the legal scholar Paul Weiler a t the law's f i f t i e t h ann ive r sa ry 
nine y e a r s ago, t ha t the s ides a r e t o t a l l y r eve r sed : management i s 
conten t with i t , while organized labor thinks tha t maybe the b e s t thing 
would be to scrap the law and r e t u r n to "the law of the jungle."1 Is any 
purpose to be served by r e v i s i t i n g those d i s t a n t days when the Wagner 
Act was hailed as Labor's Magna Char ta? In a r ecen t e s say , 2 I made the 
labor h i s to r i an ' s case for why knowledge of i t s p a s t is important to a 
union movement b e s e t by t r o u b l e s . My argument took note of the apparen t 
anomaly of the r ecen t Elec t romat ion decision: t ha t labor-management 
shop committees, which many In Indus t ry and government consider to be 
e s s e n t i a l for fos te r ing employee pa r t i c ipa t i on , a r e ac tua l ly i l lega l under 
Section Sa(2) of the law. I c i t ed 8a(2) only "to remind us t ha t the 
principles and ru les [ the law] a s s e r t s came out of a p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r y 
and were premised on a specif ic s e t of indus t r i a l condi t ions." But what I 
had intended as a passing o b s e r v a t i o n tu rns out to have pecul ia r 
re levance to a growing deba te in American today over labor law reform. 
At the h e a r t of t ha t debate is the ques t ion of workplace r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . 
And on exploring fu r the r , I have d iscovered tha t , far from being marginal 
to the main purposes of the law, t h a t ques t ion , and how It was reso lved , 
s tood at the hea r t of the or iginal debate over the Wagner Act. 
Even today 8a(2) remains p r i s t i n e , without the usua l e n c r u s t a t i o n of 
case law of a s i x t y - y e a r old-provis ion. The National Labor Re la t i ons 
Board recognized th is in i t s finding in the Elec t romat lon c a s e , which i s 
based primarily on an examination of l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . Sena to r Wagner is 
quoted extensively, and there Is c l o s e a t t en t ion to the s u c c e s s i v e 
wording of Section 8a(2)£9which in the end prohibits not only employer 
domination in, but I n t e r f e r e n c e with, the formation or administration of 
labor o rgan iza t ions , as well as any support financial or otherwise. The 
reach of 8a(2) is determined by how the law def ines "labor organization," 
and h e r e too the re is no mistaking the l e g i s l a t i v e intent: in i t s final 
wording, Section 2(5) l e a v e s no s h e l t e r from the p roh ib i t ions of .8a(2) for 
workplace forms of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n s o f a r as concerns the terms and 
condi t ions of employment. 
To the amici in the case who argued t h a t changed i n d u s t r i a l condi t ions 
call for a more flexible approach, the Board responds r a t h e r p l a in t ive ly 
t ha t i t cannot do so "when cong re s s iona l i n t e n t to the c o n t r a r y i s 
a b s o l u t e l y clear...."I/One can unde r s t and why, in a law committed to 
f o s t e r i n g c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s between employers and employees, 
Congress would be anxious to p r e v e n t the suborning of a c o l l e c t i v e 
bargaining agent by i t s opposi te number. But what can Sena to r Wagner and 
his co l leagues have had in mind by the r ad i ca l c o n s t r a i n t s w r i t t e n into 
Sa(2) and 2(5), c o n s t r a i n t s so sweeping t h a t they apply to employee 
o rgan iza t ions not aspir ing to c o l l e c t i v e bargaining (NLRB v.Cabot Carbon 
Co [1959]) and to employer ac t ions not t a i n t e d by an t i -un ion animus (NLRB 
v. Newport News Shipbuilding Co. T1939])? That 8a(2) was not i n a d v e r t e n t 
1
 In the original Wagner Act, the des igna t ion is 8(2), but for 
cons i s t ency ' s sake, and to avoid confusion, Sa(2) will be used th roughout . 
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became a l t o g e t h e r c e r t a i n when Congress under took the T a f t - H a r t l e y 
overhaul of 1947. The House adopted a p rov i s ion permi t t ing employers in 
the absence of a c e r t i f i e d bargaining agent- to form or maintain employee 
committees for the purpose of discussing matters of mutual i n t e r e s t , 
including the terms and condit ions of work. The provis ion was re jec ted in 
conference, specif ical ly (so Senator Taft reported) because the 
confe rees wanted the p rohib i t ions In 8a(2) l e f t "unchanged,"-i/and so they 
have remained ever s ince . 
What has changed is an i n d u s t r i a l environment t h a t now p l a c e s a 
premium on employee involvement. This t a k e s va r ious forms, from qua l i ty 
c i rc les to product ion teams and up t o , a t i t s most advanced, shop 
committees like the ones d i s e s t a b l i s h e d by E lec t romat lon . At s t a k e , 
argued some amici in t h a t c a s e , was nothing l e s s than American 
compet i t iveness in the global economy. And when the Clinton 
adminis t ra t ion came into office a fev; weeks l a t e r , lo and behold tha t was 
exact ly the posi t ion i t took. The key compe t i t ive a r e n a , s a y s S e c r e t a r y 
of Labor Robert B. Reich, is the workplace, and the goal , "high 
performance work p rac t i ce . " Workplace reform is what in the Clinton 
adminis t ra t ion ' s mind ca l l s for labor law reform. The link is expl ic i t in 
the charge i t gave to the Commission on the F u t u r e of Worker-Management 
Rela t ions , the so -ca l l ed Dunlop Commission a f t e r i t s cha i r , John T. 
Dunlop.V Although nothing is yet s e t t l e d , c l e a r l y what members of the 
Commission have in mind, and what the s e c r e t a r i e s of l abor and commerce 
had in mind when they cal led i t in to being, i s a s y s t em of workplace 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n much more var ied and c o l l a b o r a t i v e than Is permiss ib le 
under exist ing law>i/ 
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The d r i f t of the adminis tra-t ion's thinking is unde rwr i t t en by the most 
a u t h o r i t a t i v e of academic vo ices . In his r e c e n t book Governing the 
Workplace: The Fu tu re of Labor and Employment Law, Paul Weiler In fac t 
commits himself to a spec i f ic reform: Employee Participation Committees 
mandated by law for every workplace with 25 or more workers, taking as 
his model the German works-counci l system. Representat ives to these 
EPCs would be e l ec ted from within the p lants , and their dut ies would be 
"to a d d r e s s and respond to the broad spec t rum of r e s o u r c e po l ic ies of 
the firm." And ye t , powerfully argued and wide-ranging as i t i s , P r o f e s s o r 
Weller's book conta ins but a single s en t enced / sugges t i ng t h a t t h i s is a 
choice t h a t the count ry cons idered once be fo re and r e j e c t e d when i t 
chose the Wagner Act. 
In v/hat follows, I p ropose to r e t r a c e t h a t h i s t o r y , taking as my 
c e n t r a l argument t ha t what was at i s s u e - - a n d what accoun ted for the 
sweeping language of Sa(2) and 2(5)--was a sys temic choice being made 
between r iva l forms of workplace r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ^ a n d f u r t h e r , t h a t i t 
was a choice not so d i f f e ren t from the one P r o f e s s o r Weiler o f f e r s us . 
My method will be, in the fashion of t he h i s t o r i a n , to follow a b a s i ca l l y 
chronological cou r se , s topping along the v/ay at major j u n c t u r e s - - f i v e by 
my c o u n t - - t h a t seem to me bear on our d e b a t e s over labor lav/. If o t h e r s 
find in my account implications I have missed, so much the b e t t e r . 
The h i s t o r y of the Wagner Act begins two ye a r s e a r l i e r in June 1333 
with the National I n d u s t r i a l Recovery Act, the ea r ly New Deal 's 
misbegot ten e f fo r t to fight the G r e a t Depress ion through the 
c a r t e l i z a t i o n of American i ndus t ry , t h a t i s , through codes of fa i r 
competi t ion. Included in the Recovery Act was Sect ion 7a, which said t h a t 
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employees had the right to organize and ba rga in co l l ec t ive ly through 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the i r own choosing and in excerc l s ing that r ight to be 
free from the i n t e r f e r e n c e , res tra int or coercion by employers or their 
a g e n t s . Only the historian perhaps g e t s exc i ted about the quest ion of 
how 7a got into the Recovery bill, and why, once in, i t stuck. For our 
p u r p o s e s the main thing Is to understand that , while 7a might i t s e l f have 
been more or l e s s an h i s t o r i c a l accident, something like 7a was certa in 
to have been enacted , because the p r i n c i p l e s i t embodied had a l r eady 
p reva i l ed in an ideological s t rugg le going back a t l e a s t s e v e r a l decades . 
Since ea r ly in America's i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n , l i b e r t y of c o n t r a c t had 
been the rul ing employment pr inciple in law, applying even to agreements 
for which a condition of the Job was not joining a union or going on 
s t r i k e . More pa la t ab le in l a t e r y e a r s than the yellow-dog c o n t r a c t , 
however, was the open-shop argument, which cal led on employers 
themselves to safeguard the c o n t r a c t u a l freedom of the i r workers by 
having no dealings, with t r ade unions. But in a 2 0 t h - c e n t u r y world of 
g r e a t i n d u s t r i a l co rpora t ions and armies of workers , individual r i g h t s 
s t e a d i l y l o s t ground to the more u rgen t claims of co l l ec t ive ac t ion . As 
an answer to the epidemic of s t r i k e s and i n d u s t r i a l violence the U.S. 
Commission on Indus t r i a l Relat ions recommended in 1915 a c o l l e c t i v e -
bargaining law. During World War I, when wartime policy did br ief ly p r o t e c t 
organizing r i g h t s , a threshold v/as c r o s s e d , notwi ths tanding the ugly 
pos twar r e a c t i o n . After the col lapse of a na t i ona l conference Woodrov 
Wilson had called in 1919 to find a common ground between labor and 
c a p i t a l , Bernard Baruch a s su red the P r e s i d e n t t h a t , desp i t e 
I r r econc i l ab le d i f fe rences , the p a r t i c i p a n t s "did not at any time, r e j e c t 
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the pr inc ip le of the r ight o f w o r k e r s to organize and bargain co l l ec t ive ly 
with t h e i r employers. '^And when the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 
a s s e r t e d that right as public policy, there'was no audible d i s s e n t . 
Indeed, part of the language of Section 7a(l) i s l i f ted bodily from Norrls-
LaGuardia, and the r e s t Is a paraphrase. There in Norris-LaGuardia, 
moreover, are the key doctrinal words of the Wagner Act—"full freedom 
of assoc iat ion" and "actua.1 l iberty of contract." That l a t t e r phrase 
d i sposes of an expiring legal t h e o r y - a c t u a l l i b e r t y of c o n t r a c t is what 
public policy demands, not the f ict ion of f r e e l y c o n t r a c t i n g ind lv ldua l s -
-and the d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t the yellow-dog c o n t r a c t is unenforceable in 
the f e d e r a l c o u r t s d r ives the conclusion n e a t l y home. 
Sec t ion 7a advances beyond Nor r i s -LaGuard ia only insofar as 
inclusion in the NRA codes of fair compet i t ion makes i t more than a mere 
s t a t e m e n t of public policy. In fact , inc lus ion in the codes was not much 
of an advance , and inef f ec tua l i ty is the s t a n d a r d theme of 7a h i s t o r y - -
of the hopes of I n d u s t r i a l workers r a i s e d and then c rushed by the 
r e s i s t a n c e of powerful c o r p o r a t e i n t e r e s t s and the f e c k l e s s n e s s of the 
Nev; Deal. All too t r u e . Yet, from the p e r s p e c t i v e of our own failed labor 
law, 7a can be seen in a qu i te d i f fe ren t l i gh t , for what i t a lso 
demons t r a t ed was the power of ideas whose time had come. Today, the 
underlying pr inciples a r e masked by a l l the encumbering amendments, 
cour t and NLRB doc t r ine , and I n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s engulfing the labor 
law. Sec t ion 7a s tood qu i te alone, l i t t l e more than an a s s s e r t i o n of 
p r inc ip l e s , but for t h a t very reason capable of summoning up the force 
tha t brought the Wagner Act into being. Remarkably, the va l id i ty of the 
p r inc ip les were themselves never deba ted , only what they requi red , and 
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from th i s came a s e r i e s of ru l ings , conceived of a t the time as an 
emerging common law of l abor , t ha t f inal ly was codified in the Wagner Act: 
the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n e l ec t ion , majori ty ru le -and exclusive r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , 
and a l i s t of enjoined unfair labor p r a c t i c e s by employers. 
Once on the books, the Wagner Act developed enormous moral f o r c e . The 
American Civil L ibe r t i e s Union cons idered i t "in e f fec t a c iv i l l i b e r t i e s 
s t a t u t e " and placed i t a t the top of the l i s t of F i r s t Amendment 
achievements for 1937. This was the a tmosphere in which the Supreme 
Court s u r p r i s e d i t s c r i t i c s and handed down the c ruc ia l Jones and 
Laughlin (1937) decision upholding the Wagner Act. The law mani fes ted , in 
f ac t , a new unders tanding of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r igh t s beginning to emerge 
during the New Deal. "Perhaps i t is time to think of civi l l i b e r t y as 
p r o t e c t i o n b_v the s t a t e r a t h e r than agains t the s t a t e , " wro te John 
Dewey in 1936. The record of the ACLU--it in i t i a l ly opposed the Wagner 
Act on t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r t a r i a n g r o u n d s - - i s a pe r f ec t Ind ica to r of th is 
remarkable shi f t , which was a precondi t ion for the civil r i g h t s r evo lu t ion 
of the 1960s. In the 1930s, however, i t was labor ' s r i gh t s t h a t occupied 
c e n t e r s t a g e . Lis ten to Roger Baldwin of the ACLU speaking In 1938: 
However important or s ignif icant may be the s t rugg le for the po l i t i ca l 
r i gh t s of f i f teen million Negroes; however important or s ign i f i can t the 
defense of re l ig ious l i b e r t i e s ; of academic freedom; of freedom of the 
p r e s s , radio or motion p i c t u r e s , t he se a r e on the whole t r i f l i ng in 
na t iona l e f fec t compared with the fight for the r igh t s of l abor to 
o r g a n i z e d 
The debate over labor law reform could do worse than to s t a r t from 
Baldwin's s t a t emen t or, more r e a l i s t i c a l l y perhaps , from the p ropos i t i on 
t ha t "full freedom of a s soc i a t i on" and "ac tua l l i b e r t y of c o n t r a c t " a re 
r i g h t s of workers worthy of being g u a r a n t e e d by the s t a t e . If t h a t 
p ropos i t ion no longer holds the a l legiance of the coun t ry , b e t t e r to know 
i t and proceed accordingly tkan to remain as we a r e today where the 
p r a c t i c a l e f f ec t of the law Is to deny to workers the r igh t s the law s a y s 
they have. If, as I be l ieve , such a clarifyin-g d e b a t e would s e r v e to 
r e v i t a l i z e the e s t ab l i shed pr inciples of the Wagner Act, the b a t t l e for 
reform would be t h r e e - q u a r t e r s won: we know q u i t e well what i t would 
take to curb employer intimidation of union workers , make the 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n e lec t ion t ru ly the f r ee choice of employees, and el iminate 
the b a r r i e r s to the f i r s t c o n t r a c t . More to the point for t h i s inquiry , 
and where the pathway to reform is l e s s c l e a r , we would a lso have some 
principled c r i t e r i a for a s s e s s i n g changes in the law intended to f o s t e r 
a l t e r n a t i v e forms of workplace r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . 
That was what Section 7a provided in the t r i a l period leading up to the 
Wagner Act, which leads me to my second h i s t o r i c a l j u n c t u r e : how open-
shop employers proposed to meet the t e s t of 7a. The damning term 
commonly used by h i s t o r i a n s , and by c r i t i c s a t the time, was the company 
union, but we will do b e t t e r to accept the term advanced by employers 
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and one more functionally d e s c r i p t i v e - - t h e employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n plan 
(ERP), or, in some companies, the works counci l . This was a workplace 
system of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , normally l imited to single p l a n t s , and not 
contemplating c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s . That the works council would be the 
f i r s t line of employer defense was obvious f rom' the jockeying over 
Sect ion 7a before the Recovery Act was enac ted , and while i n d u s t r v 
lobby i s t s had not go t ten what they w a n t e d - - a p rov iso p r o t e c t i n g 
"exist ing s a t i s f a c t o r y re la t i o n s " - - t h e y went away s a t i s f i e d tha t 7a v/as 
loose enough to encompass employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ^ Immediately the lav/ 
was signed, the re was a tremendous rush to put ERPs into e f f ec t , 
S 
some t imes wi th a c h a r a d e of -employee c o n s u l t a t i o n , m o s t l y n o t . The 
c y n i c a l m o t i v e s were a l l t oo p la in . 
Yet employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l s o had q u i t e r e s p e c t a b l e , w e l l - f o u n d e d 
r o o t s In the advanced management thinking of the time. The most d i r e c t 
l ine i n t o New Deal h i s t o r y runs back t o John D. R o c k e f e l l e r , Jr. , the v e r y 
e a r n e s t h e i r t o t h e S t a n d a r d Oil f o r t u n e . One of h i s p r o p e r t i e s , t h e 
C o l o r a d o F u e l and I ron Company, had fought a b i t t e r s t r i k e f o r 
r e c o g n i t i o n by t h e United Mine Workers t h a t ended in t h e Ludlow M a s s a c r e 
of 1914. R o c k e f e l l e r c laimed I g n o r a n c e of t h e f i rm 's a f f a i r s , only t o be 
p u b l i c l y e x p o s e d by e v i d e n c e d e v e l o p e d by t h e Commission on I n d u s t r i a l 
R e l a t i o n s . E m b a r r a s s e d and c h a s t e n e d , he c a l l e d in t h e Canad ian 
i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s e x p e r t (and l a t e r pr ime m i n i s t e r ) W.L. Mackenzie King, 
and b e t w e e n them t h e y d e v i s e d a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p l an for t h e C o l o r a d o 
mines . T h e n c e f o r t h , R o c k e f e l l e r became a f e r v e n t and v o c a l a d v o c a t e , 
e s t a b l i s h i n g a s imi lar p lan a t S t a n d a r d Oil (NJ) in 1918, and t a k i n g what he 
c o n s i d e r e d to be an a d v a n c e d p o s i t i o n in f a v o r of i n d u s t r i a l d e m o c r a c y in 
t h e p o s t w a r p e r i o d . S u b s e q u e n t l y he f i n a n c e d t h e mos t i m p o r t a n t 
r e s e a r c h and c o n s u l t i n g o p e r a t i o n of i t s kind in t h e 1 9 2 0 s - - I n d u s t r i a l 
R e l a t i o n s C o u n s e l o r s , Inc^v^ 
In e a r l y 1934, a t the h e i g h t of the b a t t l e s o v e r 7a , t he h e a d of t h a t 
g r o u p , A r t h u r H. Young, became v ice p r e s i d e n t in c h a r g e of i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s a t the United S t a t e s S t e e l C o r p o r a t i o n . From t h a t p e r c h , Young 
did t h e s t r a t e g i c thinking fo r the n a t i o n a l ERP movement . And in t h e S t e e l 
C o r p o r a t i o n , with i t s 200 ,000 employees and p r e - e m i n e n t p l a c e in 
American i n d u s t r y , he had a big s t a g e for t e s t i n g h i s p r o g r a m . We can g e t 
a t a s t e of what Young t hough t he was up to from a s t a t e m e n t of p r i n c i p l e 
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he was fond of quoting: 
The human element in Indus t ry is the f a c t o r of g r e a t e s t Importance. 
Capital cannot exis t wi thout labor and labor wi thout c a p i t a l is h e l p l e s s . 
The development of each is dependent on th-e c o o p e r a t i o n of the o t h e r . 
Confidence and good will a r e the founda t ions of e v e r y s u c c e s s f u l 
e n t e r p r i s e , and t he se can be c r e a t e d only by secu r ing a point of c o n t a c t 
between employer and employee. They roust seek to u n d e r s t a n d each 
o t h e r ' s problems, unde r s t and each o t h e r ' s opinions, and maintain t h a t 
uni ty of purpose and e f f o r t upon which the v e r y e x i s t e n c e of the 
community which they c o n s t i t u t e and the whole f u t u r e of democra t i c 
c iv i l i za t ion d e p e n d ^ 
So how did employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f a r e in p r a c t i c e ? The plans 
commonly called for Joint counci ls , with management and labor accorded 
equal v o t e s , and a major i ty requ i red for any a c t i o n - - a t r a n s p a r e n t 
management ve to , of c o u r s e . The d e t a i l s va r i ed , but the small p r i n t 
invar iably l e f t the final word to management. At I n t e r n a t i o n a l H a r v e s t e r , 
where Arthur Young ran things in the e a r l y 1920s, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s who 
s tepped out of line got a hard l e s son ; they were laid off or 
transferred.HyWhen labor c o s t s had to be cu t , as in the sharp r e c e s s i o n 
of 1920-21, the ERPs found themselves bypassed and t h e r e b y de f l a t ed , 
and, in genera l , on wages and the ba s i c terms of employment they got 
nov/here. Yet i t was a lso t r u e t h a t , a f t e r the shakeou t of plans i n i t i a t e d 
only to s a t i s f y a wartime d i r ec t i ve or to c o u n t e r a unionizing t h r e a t in 
the postwar s t r ike per iod, employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n developed a good 
deal of s taying power. The n e c e s s a r y i ng red i en t s seem to have been, 
f i r s t , a personnel depar tment capable of curbing l ine s u p e r v i s o r s , 
second, an es tab l i shed and p r o g r e s s i v e b e n e f i t s program, and, th i rd , 
company willingness to expend the energy needed to keep the p lans from 
winding down into Inac t iv i ty -^Wi th 7a, of c o u r s e , t h e r e was a new influx 
of firms not t ruly committed to the ERP concept , and this was, as Arthur 
Young l a t e r ackowledged, a problem he had to overcome when he joined 
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Uni ted S t a t e s S t e e L ^ O n t h e ' o t h e r hand , t h e i n c e n t i v e s to make t h e ERPs 
work w e r e now v a s t l y higher than b e f o r e , and, in f a c t , o v e r t h e n e x t two 
y e a r s t h e y were much r e w r i t t e n and g e n e r a l l y made more a u t o n o m o u s of 
managemen t . 
Fo r t h o s e in t h e l a b o r movement who h a v e been wondering w h e t h e r shop 
c o m m i t t e e s might not be a halfway h o u s e toward un ion iza t ion , the answer 
from t h e h i s t o r y I h a v e b e e n d e s c r i b i n g i s a q u a l i f i e d y e s . The e v i d e n c e 
s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e ERPs did f o s t e r l o c a l l e a d e r s h i p and, i n s o f a r a s t h e y 
f a i l e d t o p r o d u c e r e s u l t s , did e d u c a t e w o r k e r s and s t r e n g t h e n t h e c a s e 
f o r c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g by o u t s i d e u n i o n s . An e x t r e m e i n s t a n c e i s t o be 
found in t h e Akron r u b b e r I n d u s t r y w h e r e , a f t e r f o s t e r i n g i t s I n d u s t r i a l 
Assembly for f i f t e e n y e a r s , G o o d y e a r u n i l a t e r a l l y r e - I m p o s e d an e i g h t -
hou r day in 1935 and opened t h e f l o o d g a t e s of u n i o n i z a t i o n . At A r t h u r 
Young's s h o w c a s e in U.S. S t e e l , t h e ERPs in t h e s h e e t and t i n p l a t e 
s u b s i d i a r y moved in 1935 o v e r h i s o b j e c t i o n s t o w a r d f e d e r a t i o n and t h e 
n e x t y e a r the ERP^s a t t he b a s i c s t e e l s u b s i d i a r y w e r e s e i z e d by un ion 
a d h e r e n t s who, a t a c r i t i c a l moment, wen t in a body o v e r to t h e CIO. 
For t h o s e wonder ing w h e t h e r t h e ERP e x p e r i e n c e of s i x t y y e a r s ago 
s u g g e s t s t h a t shop c o m m i t t e e s can i n c u l c a t e t h e company l o y a l t y and 
commitment v;e now p r i z e , t h e a n s w e r i s a l s o a q u a l i f i e d y e s . A p r e t t y f a i r 
t e s t would be how the ERPs f a r e d a f t e r 1935 when t h e y came up a g a i n s t 
CIO c h a l l e n g e and NLRB d i s e s t a b l i s h m e n t . At c o m p a n i e s t h a t had made a 
l o n g - t e r m i n v e s t m e n t In p r o g r e s s i v e l a b o r r e l a t l o n s - - D u p o n t , f o r 
example , or AT <!< T - - i n d e p e n d e n t u n i o n s did t a k e r o o t . When Leo T r o y 
s u r v e y e d t h i s l i t t l e - n o t i c e d s e c t o r in 1961, he e s t i m a t e d a membersh ip of 
1.5 mil l ion In 2,000 o r g a n i z a t i o n s , a l t h o u g h he c o u l d no t s p e c i f y what 
11 . 
p e r c e n t a g e of t h e s e ac tua l ly" s temmed from the pre-Wagner Act E R P s ^ / 
And, in l ight of c u r r e n t union-avoidance s t r a t e g i e s , Sanford Jacoby has 
more r e c e n t l y given r e s p e c t f u l a t t e n t i o n to firms whose w e l f a r i s t 
po l ic ies in f ac t worked and who r e t a i n e d the l o y a l t y of t h e i r w o r k e r s ^ / ' 
As to the big q u e s t i o n of whether employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n had ever 
o f fe red a viable policy choice: the answer i s , again, a highly qual i f ied 
y e s . The r e a l i t y was t h a t because employers had moved so swif t ly , the 
works counci ls a l ready occupied the ground. At t h e i r peak in 1934, they 
covered probably 3 million workers , more than did the unions and, in the 
m a s s - p r o d u c t i o n s e c t o r where they were roost heav i ly c o n c e n t r a t e d , very 
much more. That f a c t - - t h a t the ERPs ex i s t ed , t h a t they were functioning, 
t h a t enormous b u s i n e s s I n t e r e s t s s tood behind them--had to be taken 
into accoun t , and, i n i t i a l l y , i t more than any o t h e r s e t the terms of the 
d e b a t e . But t he re was ano the r fact t ha t a l so had to be taken in to 
account . With 7a, employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was no longer a p r i v a t e affair , 
but , on the c o n t r a r y , one deeply entangled in a mass ive program of 
i n d u s t r i a l r egu la t ion , which brings me to my th i rd h i s t o r i c a l j u n c t u r e . 
In deciding about how to square employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n with 7a, the 
coun t ry was a lso deciding what kind of a u t h o r i t y t he s t a t e should a s s e r t 
over labor-management r e l a t i o n s . The con tex t in which this happened 
nea r ly de f ies r ecap tu r ing , for the NRA r e p r e s e n t s America's one se r ious 
romance with a c o r p o r a t i s t economy. Each of some 400 codes of fair 
compet i t ion contained in addit ion to comprehensive t r a d e r e g u l a t i o n s not 
only Sec t ion 7a, but more or l e s s de t a i l ed p r o v i s i o n s on wages, hours 
child l abor and a v a r i e t y of working cond i t ions . A profus ion of agencies 
sprang up to i n t e r p r e t and enforce all t h l s - - t h e Nat iona l Labor Board of 
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1933-34, the s u c c e s s o r Nat ional Labor Re la t ions Board of 1934-1935, 
regional labor boards and a few i n d u s t r y labor boa rds , o the r labor 
boards under code a u t h o r i t y , and, f ina l ly , a whole h o s t of NRA compliance 
and code committees. The question of co l l e c t i ve bargaining r ights was 
enmeshed in this bureaucratic Jungle and intermingled with other, 
sometimes more pressing, NRA concerns with maintaining code labor 
standards and se t t l ing Industrial d i sputes . In this s t a t e of confusion or, 
if you will, open p o s s i b i l i t i e s , what was a t i s s u e was not only the 
def in i t ion of bargaining r i g h t s , but t he scope of s t a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
The Wagner Act embodied one r e s o l u t i o n — of c o u r s e , the one t h a t 
p reva i l ed . But consider ano the r . The powerful men a t the head of the 
Nat ional Recovery Administrat ion, Genera l Hugh Johnson and his gene ra l 
counse l Donald Richberg, took the view t h a t Sect ion 7a cal led for a 
"pe r fec t n e u t r a l i t y " between forms of l abor organiza t ion . The company 
union was j u s t as l eg i t ima te as the t r a d e union. I t was the employer 's 
duty to deal with both of them, i n s o f a r as each was f ree ly chosen by 
employees, but by v i r t u e of the i r claim to be r e p r e s e n t e d , not to g ran t 
exc lus ive recogni t ion to e i t h e r . The Johnson-Richberg plan contemplated 
multiple r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , p r o t e c t i o n of the r i gh t s of minor i t i e s and 
individuals , no bar aga ins t company unions, and a kind of loca l opt ion 
over the ac tua l forms of co l l ec t i ve b a r g a i n i n g - - l e t the p a r t i e s decide 
what they wanted, so to s p e a k ^ ^ 
Where th i s might have led is b e s t seen in the P r e s i d e n t ' s a u t o 
s e t t l e m e n t of March 25, 1934. The i n i t i a t i n g c r i s i s was e n t i r e l y 
emblematic of the time: the AFL unions were demanding r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
e l e c t i o n s leading to exclusive r ecogn i t ion , the companies answered tha t 
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the i r workers a l ready had r e p r e s e n t a t i o n through the ERPs, but t h a t 
they were willing to deal with (but not recognize or c o n t r a c t with) the 
unions for the i r own members (providing membership l i s t s were t u rned 
over) . Fea r fu l t h a t a na t iona l a u t o s t r i k e might s e t back economic 
r e c o v e r y , P r e s i d e n t Rooseve l t himself i n t e r v e n e d and c r a f t ed a 
s e t t l e m e n t embodying the Johnson-Rlchberg pr inc ip les I have j u s t 
desc r ibed , but implemented on the spec i f ic b a s i s of p ropo r t i ona l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Employers agreed to barga in with "the f ree ly chosen 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of groups," with the bargaining committee, if t h e r e was 
more than one group in a p lan t , to have " t o t a l membership p r o r a t a to the 
number of men each member r e p r e s e n t s . " To enforce the s e t t l e m e n t the 
P r e s i d e n t appointed a spec ia l Automobile Labor Board with final and 
binding a u t h o r i t y . The Board f i r s t d e a l t with the backlog of 
d iscr iminat ion c a s e s , then in ea r ly 1935 adminis tered e l ec t ions for v/hat 
i t ca l led "bargaining agencies" for eve ry au to p lant in the coun t ry 
(except Ford), the^ members of which were ident i f ied by a f f i l i a t ion and 
s e l e c t e d by a complex p r o c e s s to r e f l e c t the p lant -wide vo t e . Each 
member a c t e d as gr ievance person for h i s / h e r own d i s t r i c t , and on 
b roade r i s s u e s s a t on the bargaining agencyXJ^The agencies r ep laced the 
ERPs, gene ra l ly adopting the i r d i s t r i c t l i n e s , and became in e f f e c t the 
s t a t e - m a n d a t e d works councils Paul Weiler has in mind. 
We might t h e r e f o r e pause to ask what l ight t h a t experience throws on 
the c u r r e n t enthusiasm for a l t e r n a t i v e forms of workplace 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Insofar as the works counci ls in the P r o f e s s o r Weiler's 
plan a r e intended to be supplementary to ex is t ing co l l ec t ive bargaining 
p r o t e c t i o n s , not in l ieu of them as was the ca se with the 1934 a u t o 
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s e t t l e m e n t , to t h a t degree ol course the two s i t u a t i o n s a r e not 
comparable. And, in f ac t , the auto works counci ls d isplayed ve ry much the 
same weaknesses as the ERPs they rep laced , with members of the 
bargaining agencies complaining tha t in dealing with management they had 
no Independent base of power and no claims on the l a t t e r beyond the 
r ight to be heardr^/^Yet in the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s they imposed on the 
s t a t e , the au to works councils do have a c e r t a i n r e l e v a n c e for l abor law 
reform. 
The Automobile Labor Board, employing a s t a f f of over a hundred, 
ordered and adminis tered the plant e l e c t i o n s a c r o s s the i n d u s t r y , and, on 
unreso lved g r i evances , began to function as a kind of labor c o u r t . Who 
would be charged with t h e s e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s if the law mandates , or even 
only a u t h o r i z e s , works counci ls? If full freedom of a s s o c i a t i o n ' r e m a i n s 
bas ic d o c t r i n e in the law, as I assume i t will, will i t fal l to the NLRE to 
police the works councils and shop committees a g a i n s t the t h r e a t of 
company domination and manipulation? If so , by what c r i t e r i a ? At the 
time, a u t o un ion i s t s c a s t i g a t e d the works counci ls for being power less , 
but the h i s t o r i c a l record also r evea l s them cal l ing the counci ls 
"government unions." Most ce r ta in ly , labor lav; r e fo rmer s will want to 
think ca re fu l ly about what functions the s t a t e will be under taking if i t 
becomes the au thor of a l t e r n a t i v e forms of workplace r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . 
The au to s e t t l emen t was a rea l a l t e r n a t i v e a t the time. P r e s i d e n t 
Rooseve l t put i t for th as the bas is on which "a more comprehensive, a 
more a d e q u a t e and a more equi table sys tem of I n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s may be 
buil t than ever before . It is my hope t ha t th is sy s t em may develop into a 
kind of works council in industry in which al l groups of employees, 
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w h a t e v e r may be t h e i r c h o i c e - o f o r g a n i z a t i o n or form of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , 
may p a r t i c i p a t e in Jo in t c o n f e r e n c e s wi th t h e i r e m p l o y e r s . ^ ' Think a b o u t 
what our l a b o r r e l a t i o n s might h a v e l o o k e d l ike had FDR's "hope" come t o 
p a s s . 
We come now to my f o u r t h h i s t o r i c a l J u n c t u r e — t h e moment of t r u t h , so 
to s p e a k - - w h e n C o n g r e s s c h o s e t h e p a t h l e a d i n g to t h e Wagner Ac t . From 
the day S e n a t o r Wagner s e t in mo t ion t h e d r a f t i n g p r o c e s s in e a r l y 1934, 
the b a s i c s t r a t e g y p r o c e e d e d on two t r a c k s , one l e a d i n g t o a v i a b l e 
framework fo r f r e e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , t h e o t h e r t o t h e e x p u r g a t i o n of 
the r i v a l workplace r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s y s t e m . For t h e l a t t e r p u r p o s e , a 
s e r v i c e a b l e weapon was a t hand in a p r i n c i p l e a l r e a d y wel l e s t a b l i s h e d in 
r a i lway l a b o r lav/: t h a t employer d o m i n a t i o n of l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s v/as an 
exc luded a c t i v i t y c o r o l l a r y to t h e r i g h t of s e l f - o r g a n i z a t i o n i ^ - S p e c i f y i n g 
such excluded a c t i v i t y was t h e v e r y f i r s t p rob lem t o which S e n a t o r 
Wagner 's team gave d e t a i l e d a t t e n t i o n when t h e y p r o d u c e d t h e s k e t c h y 
i n i t i a l d r a f t d a t e d J a n u a r y 31, 1934X*>/How f a r to e x t e n d t h e c u r b s on 
employer domina t ion , h o w e v e r , was n o t i n i t i a l l y c l e a r . The f i n i s h e d d r a f t 
of t h e l a b o r d i s p u t e s b i l l (S. 292G) t h a t Wagner s u b m i t t e d to t h e S e n a t e 
on March 1 def ined a s l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h o s e e x i s t i n g f o r t h e p u r p o s e 
"of dea l i ng with employe r s c o n c e r n i n g g r i e v a n c e s , l a b o r d i s p u t e s , wages 
or h o u r s of employment." A more c o m p r e h e n s i v e p h r a s e c o v e r i n g " o t h e r 
t e r m s of employment" ough t to be added , a key a c a d e m i c a d v i s e r William E. 
L e i s e r s o n w r o t e Wagner. O t h e r w i s e , " t h e c o n t e n t i o n may be made t h a t 
company un ions may be kep t in e x i s t e n c e to d e a l wi th t h o s e t e r m s of 
employment t h a t a r e no t c o v e r e d in t h i s s u b - s e c t i o n d e f i n i n g " labor 
o r g a n i z a t i o n ' . " Similar r e a s o n i n g p r o m p t e d L e i s e r s o n ' s c o l l e a g u e Edwin H. 
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Witte to urge the addition o-f "employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n committee" to the 
def in i t ion of labor organiza t ion:^ /Logic went in one d i rec t ion , bu t 
p o l i t i c s in another . In ear ly May S e n a t o r Wagner l o s t the i n i t i a t i v e In 
the Sena t e Education and Labor Committee, and the powerful cha i r , David 
I. Walsh, pushed for a more accommodating bi l l . 
Walsh's s u b s t i t u t e permi t ted employers to i n i t i a t e and in f luence , but 
not i n t e r f e r e with or dominate, employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n commit tees (and 
o the r forms of labor organizat ion) , to pay employee r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s for 
the i r time (but not c o n t r i b u t e f inancia l ly to labor o rgan iza t ions ) , and 
e n t i r e l y dropped the handling of g r i e v a n c e s as a defining funct ion of 
p r o t e c t e d labor organiza t ions . Had the p r e s e r v a t i o n of employee 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n been the i r primary concern, employers should have 
welcomed the Walsh s u b s t i t u t e , but of c o u r s e t he i r r e a l i n t e r e s t was not 
p r o t e c t i n g the ERPs, but fending off genuine c o l l e c t i v e bargaining, and 
h e r e , while the Walsh s u b s t i t u t e made the key concess ion of dropping the 
explici t duty to recognize and barga in with r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of employees , 
« 
employers could not be s u r e t ha t they would not be faced with exc lus ive 
bargaining agents se lec ted by s e c r e t ba l lo t through majori ty r u l e , al l of 
which was permissible at the d i s c r e t i o n of the " indus t r i a l ad jus tment 
board" c r e a t e d by Walsh's b i l lX^ 
After i t was too l a t e Arthur Young remarked t h a t he thought t h a t 
employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e bargaining were not incompatible 
and could fruitful ly function side by side'^/ll t h a t was Young's belief , he 
had blown his chance. Employers, Young included, fought the Walsh bi l l , and 
helped get i t killed in June 1934. In a revea l ing l e t t e r , Young f igured 
t h a t time was on his side: the e f f o r t s to enforce 7a could be s tonev/al led 
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unt i l i t expired, and t h e r e would never "be given as good a chance for 
the p a s s a g e of the the Wagner Act as now [June 16, 1934]."^^fcut time 
proved to be on Wagner's s ide , not Young's. The s team went out of the 
p r o - b u s i n e s s NRA experiment; the 1934 Congress iona l e l e c t i o n s swept out 
the Republican r ight wing and c r e a t e d the most l i b e r a l Congress in 
memory; and the fu t i le s t r u g g l e to enforce 7a exposed eve r more sharply 
the cynicism behind al l the fine talk about the r i g h t s of workers (not 
l e a s t by the publ icat ion of Young's damaging l e t t e r ) . There is no way of 
unders tand ing what drove the campaign for a labor law wi thout taking 
account of the n a t u r e of management's o p p o s i t i o n - - a b o v e a l l , to the 
p rospec t of genuine c o l l e c t i v e bargaining with independent un ions - -and , 
of c o u r s e , the misca lcu la t ions t ha t come so ea s i l y to people bent on 
p r e se rv ing the i r power. 
When Sena to r Wagner resumed the b a t t l e in the 1935 Congress , the 
gloves were off. The def in i t ion of employer domination of a labor 
organiza t ion becomes a i r t i g h t , and l ikewise the meaning of labor 
organiza t ion in 2(5). On reading the d r a f t , S e c r e t a r y of Labor Frances 
Perkins noted tha t labor organiza t ions were defined as o rgan iza t ions 
c r e a t e d for the purpose of "dealing with employers." Would not bargaining 
co l l ec t ive ly be the p r e f e r r e d term? No, came the vehement re jo inder . If 
Sena tor Wagner accepted Perkins ' amendment, "then most of the a c t i v i t y 
of employers in connect ion with the company unions we a r e seeking to 
outlaw would fall ou t s ide the scope of the Act. If, as employers i n s i s t , 
such "plans," e tc . , a re lawful r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of employees, then 
employers ' a c t i v i t y r e l a t i v e to them should be c l ea r ly included, whether 
they merely "adjust ' or ex is t as a "method of c o n t a c t , ' or engage in 
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genuine c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. It i s for th i s r e a s o n t h a t the bill u s e s the 
broad term 'dealing w i t h ' . " ^ / 
The a r c h i t e c t s of the bil l a r e e n t i r e l y ' c l e a r about the fac t t h a t they 
are forcing a sys temic choice. Hence, for example, the i n s i s t e n c e on 
re ta in ing gr ievance handling as a defining function of labor 
o rgan iza t ions . Because employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n plans a r e mostly "nothing 
but agencies for p r e s e n t i n g and d i scuss ing g r i evances and o the r minor 
m a t t e r s . . . t o exclude the term ' g r i evances ' p a r t i c u l a r l y would exclude from 
the p rov i s ions of th i s ac t the v a s t field of employer I n t e r f e r e n c e with 
s e l f - o r g a n i z a t i o n by way of such plans or commit tees . *^/This s t a t ement, 
in i t s remarkable n e g a t i v i t y , def ines the d ra f t ing s t r a t e g y : workplace 
organizat ion is encompassed by 2(5) so t ha t It can be excluded in 8a(2). 
So did the Congress not contemplate a need for workplace 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n or recognize g r i evances as a l eg i t ima te express ion of 
employee d i s c o n t e n t ? Of cou r se i t did, only not through company-
dominated labor o rgan iza t ion o r - - j u s t as i m p o r t a n t - - n o t by l e g i s l a t i v e 
enactment. The shaping of 8a(2) has to be placed in i t s t r u e h i s t o r i c a l 
context , which was the massive NRA experiment t h a t was in place during 
this e n t i r e per iod. (The Supreme Court killed i t only on May 27, 1935.) By 
introducing s e p a r a t e labor l eg i s l a t i on , Wagner was i n t e n t on an ac t of 
disengagement from t h a t c o r p o r a t i s t morass , and the evolu t ion of the lav/ 
was dr iven by th i s in ten t ion . Thus the NLRB ends up a public board, not 
t r i p a r t i t e ; f r e e - s t a n d i n g , not a s s o c i a t e d with the Labor Department; 
concerned s t r i c t l y with co l l ec t ive bargaining r i g h t s , not with mediating 
and a r b i t r a t i n g labor d i spu t e s ; and endowed with independent , adequa te 
powers of enforcement, which, under the NRA, had been u t t e r l y lacking. 
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To define the NLRB as q u a s i - J u d i c i a l was empowering, but a l s o , in the 
freewheeling NRA contex t , delimiting. I t was th is qu i t e p r e c i s e 
combination—of s t a t e a u t h o r i t y powerfully mobilized, y e t narrowly 
a p p l i e d - - t h a t gave the Wagner Act i t s d i s t i n c t i v e c a s t and, indeed, i t s 
p a r t i c u l a r programmatic t h r u s t : the lav; p r o t e c t e d the r ight to organize 
and bargaining co l lec t ive ly ; c o l l e c t i v e bargaining i t s e l f remained f r ee . 
Sect ion Sa(2) is pa r t of t h a t g r e a t s e t t l e m e n t , disengaging workplace 
r e l a t i o n s from the meddling NRA s t r u c t u r e and leaving It in the realm of 
f ree c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. 
And th i s brings me to my final h i s t o r i c a l j u n c t u r e . When c o l l e c t i v e 
bargaining began in 1936 and 1937, t h e r e was l i t t l e argument about what 
would go into the f i r s t c o n t r a c t s : p rov i s ion for shop s t ewards or 
committeemen, a formal g r ievance p r o c e d u r e , and the pr inc ip les of 
s e n i o r i t y in layoff and r e h i r e , pay equi ty a c r o s s jobs , and a t l e a s t 
Implicitly j u s t cause in d i scha rge and d isc ip l inary actions-XJ^The 
hallmarks of the .unionized workplace a r e p r e s e n t a t i t s b i r th . Where had 
they sprung from? From a h i s t o r y of shopfloor s t r u g g l e accompanying, and 
in my view driving, the l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y I have been descr ib ing . The 
s t a r t i n g point went back much before the New Deal to the emergence of 
mass -p roduc t ion technology and the p a r a l l e l development of i n t e r n a l 
labor marke ts and h i e r a r ch i c a l command s t r u c t u r e s . In the 1920s and even 
e a r l i e r , one can already spot the key elements in va r ious f i rms- -pay 
equi ty as job c l a s s i f i c a t i on sys t ems appeared, r u l e s for r egu la t i ng job 
oppor tun i ty among permanent employees, due p r o c e s s in d i sc ip l inary 
m a t t e r s , a fe l t need for some formal mechanism for e l ic i t ing the views of 
workers and for p rocess ing the i r g r i e v a n c e s , which was of c o u r s e the 
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b e s t argument for the employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n plans . The problem was 
tha t c o r p o r a t e employers were only imperfec t ly committed to what they 
themse lves had c r e a t e d . And when the Grea't Depress ion s t r u c k , t h e s e 
f a i l u r e s became magnified in \he minds of workers , who facing 
unemployment and speed-up had an enormous s t ake in p r e d i c t a b l e , r u l e -
bound t r e a t m e n t . This was the sou rce of the explosive r e s p o n s e to 7a — 
not from workers on the s t r e e t s , but from those a t work embi t t e r ed by 
c a p r i c i o u s and a r b i t r a r y t r ea tmen t t h a t v io la ted the very p r e c e p t s of 
b u r e a u c r a t i c o rder of the c o r p o r a t e e n t e r p r i s e I t se l f . 
The workplace e v e n t s of the pre-Wagner Act e ra al l moved in a common 
d i r e c t i o n . Even a t t he i r most p l i an t , the employee r e p r e s e n t a t i o n plans 
mark a kind of beginning for the g r i evance p rocedure . The AFL unions 
themse lves s t r e n u o u s l y r e s i s t e d the ERP sys tem but , given t h e i r 
Impotence on the bargaining f ront , they had l i t t l e choice but to channel 
the i r e n e r g i e s into workplace organ iza t ion . At General Motors , shop 
committeemen had, won the r ight to p r o c e s s the g r i evances of union 
members well be fore t h e r e was any c o n t r a c t . The s ense of formal p r o c e s s 
i nhe ren t in t h e s e emerging v/orkplace s t r u c t u r e s v/as f o s t e r e d as v/ell by 
the NRA's ha l t ing e f f o r t s a t adjudicat ing v io la t ions of Sect ion 7a. Among 
the p r inc ip l e s springing from these proceed ings , most i n t e r e s t i n g perhaps 
was s e n i o r i t y . One of the charges to the Automobile Labor Board had been 
to handle discr iminat ion cases by t e s t i n g d ischarge and r e h i r e aga ins t 
fixed c r i t e r i a , which included mar i ta l s t a t u s , eff iciency, and s e n i o r i t y . 
Invoked for th is speci f ic pnrpne P j s e n i o r i t y almost a t once became a 
gene ra l en t i t l emen t , accepted as such by the Auto Board and by the 
i n d u s t r y . When It signed with the UAW a month a f t e r s e t t l i n g the g r ea t 
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Flint sitdown s t r i k e , General Motors took the pos i t ion t h a t i t was 
embodying in the c o n t r a c t p r a c t i c e s a l ready in p lace . What remained 
implicit, but was p e r f e c t l y evident in i t s f u t u r e a c t i o n s , was t h a t 
General Motors was s a t i s f i e d tha t i t was accept ing a workplace system 
tha t met the requ i rements of a g r e a t manufac turer of mass -p roduced 
automobiles . 
Now tha t we have a r r i v e d a t the moment when t h a t no longer seems to 
be the c a s e , i t might be well to bear in mind t h a t , h i s t o r i c a l l y 
considered, the workplace con t rac tua l i sm now so much in d i s f avo r 
ac tua l ly r e p r e s e n t s a triumph of accommodation to the i n d u s t r i a l world 
as i t then was. And so , perhaps more to the point , does the l abo r law. It 
l e f t workplace r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to co l lec t ive bargaining b e c a u s e i t was 
confident of the r e s u l t , and swept out a l t e r n a t i v e forms of workplace 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n because no compelling case was made for conse rv ing them. 
The ban aga ins t company domination, a f t e r al l , is linked to the r ight to 
s e l f - o r g a n i z a t i o n . No one argued a t the time t ha t anything e l s e was at 
i s s u e , or r a t h e r , no one on management's s ide , because t h e r e were indeed 
union people like Walter Reuther and Clinton Golden who be l ieved tha t 
workers had a con t r i bu t ion to make to product ion p r a c t i c e . A c a s e , 
indeed, has been r e c e n t l y made tha t , by empowering workers , Sena to r 
Wagner and his a d v i s e r s thought they were laying the b a s i s for high-
t r u s t c o o p e r a t i v e workplace relationsX^Management h a r b o r e d no such 
vision; running the plant was the i r job. The management r i g h t s c l au se in 
union c o n t r a c t s , as Barry and Irving Bluestone have been a t pa ins to 
point outJV s t a n d s as a monument to their de te rminat ion . In i t s heyday 
before the Wagner Act, the works council was never conceived to be of 
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any s e r i o u s r e l e v a n c e t o b e t t e r p l a n t o p e r a t i o n s . Now t h a t i t i s , we 
ought no t t o r e a d t h e p a s t a s a c a u t i o n a r y t a l e , b u t r a t h e r f o r wha t i t 
t e l l s u s a b o u t t h e ways we h a v e e a r l i e r f a s h i o n e d the r i g h t r e s p o n s e s to 
our economic e n v i r o n m e n t and, in p a r t i c u l a r , a b o u t J u s t what i t was t h a t 
our l a b o r law c o n t r i b u t e d once b e f o r e — and might once a g a i n - - t o h i g h -
p e r f o r m a n c e workp lace r e l a t i o n s . 
Le t me c o n c l u d e by ment ion ing t h e f a t e of A r t h u r H. Young. In 
F e b r u a r y 1937, t h e Supreme C o u r t had no t y e t v a l i d a t e d t h e Wagner Act , 
and Young was s t i l l t r y i n g t o keep t h e ERPs a t U.S. S t e e l going. Young was 
v ice p r e s i d e n t in c h a r g e of l a b o r r e l a t i o n s , b u t he did no t know t h a t h i s 
b o s s Myron C. T a y l o r had been s e c r e t l y n e g o t i a t i n g with John L. Lewis 
s ince e a r l y J a n u a r y . Soon a f t e r t h e news of t h e union r e c o g n i t i o n 
a g r e e m e n t b roke on March 1, 1937, Young r e s i g n e d . He had t h o u g h t h imse l f 
ahead of t h e c u r v e as a p r o g r e s s i v e l a b o r m a n a g e r , b u t in f a c t he had 
f a l l en f a r behind. He was no t even in on t h e d e c i s i o n t h a t l a u n c h e d 
c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g in t h e s t e e l i n d u s t r y . 
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